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Finn: Public Lands - The Liability of the Federal Government for the Tr

Public Lands-The Liability of the Federal Government for the Trespass
of Wild Horses and Burros. Mountain States Legal Foundation v.
Clark, 740 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1984).
On December 15, 1971, Congress enacted the Wild and Free-Roaming
Horses and Burros Act.' The Act declared all unclaimed horses and burros on public lands to be under the jurisdiction of either the Secretary
of Agriculture or the Secretary of Interior for the purpose of management
and protection.2 Within six months, the Rock Springs Grazing Association (RSGA) began making repeated requests to the Secretary of the Interior to remove the wild horses from its private lands. 3
RSGA owns or controls a large quantity of grazing land interspersed
with public land in a "checkerboard" pattern in southwestern Wyoming.'
Between 1972 and 1979 the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) removed
almost fourteen hundred horses from these checkerboard lands.' Even with
these removals, the herd size increased from eleven hundred in 1971 to
twenty eight hundred in 1979.' In response to the increase of wild horses,
RSGA filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Wyoming.'
In the district court, RSGA asserted three distinct causes of action.
First, RSGA sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of the
Interior to remove the horses from the public and private lands within
the checkerboard area. Second, it claimed nominal damages for the unconstitutional taking of forage on its private lands within the checkerboard. Third, RSGA sought substantial damages from the Director of the
BLM due to his alleged improper management of wild horses under the
8
Act.
1. 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 1331-1340 (Law. Coop. 1984).
2. Id §§ 1331, 1332, 1333.
3. Opening Brief for Appellant at 7, Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Clark, 740
F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Appellant's Opening Brief].
4. Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Clark, 740 F.2d 792, 793 (10th Cir. 1984).
When the first transcontinental railroad was being constructed, the United States government conveyed to the Union Pacific Railroad the odd numbered sections of land in a forty
mile swath following the railroad route. The government retained the even numbered sections in this area. The resulting land ownership pattern therefore looked like a checkerboard.
The rationale behind this pattern of checkerboard disposition was that the value of land
along the railroad would increase. Thus, the government would recover at least as much
revenue from selling the half it retained as it would have recovered from selling the whole
if the railroad was not present. This scheme worked well to accomplish the government's

goal of land disposition for settlement of the West except on lands west of the 105th Meridian. The climate west of there was too arid for dry-land farming and was never settled by

farmers. The checkerboard pattern of land ownership remains today in these arid regions.
For a more detailed explanation of checkerboard lands, see Leo Sheep Co. v. United States,
440 U.S. 668, 669-78 (1979).
5. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 6 n.1.
6. Id. at 6.

7. Id at 3.
8. Mountain States, 740 F.2d at 793.
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The district court granted the writ of mandamus to RSGA and ordered
the BLM to remove all wild horses from the private land within one year.
The writ further ordered the BLM to reduce the wild horse population
on the checkerboard area within two years. The court then granted the
government's motions for summary judgment for both damage claims.9
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the summary judgment of the damage claim against the BLM
Director and reversed the trial court on the taking claim. The Tenth Circuit remanded the taking issue to the trial court to determine whether
forage was taken by the Secretary's failure to manage wild horses by permitting their continued foraging on private lands through the increased
numbers of horses since 1971."0 Therefore, the court of appeals implicitly
ruled that foraging by wild horses on privately owned sections within the
checkerboard is an unconstitutional taking of property if it results from
the government's failure to manage the wild horses. This is the first case
in which a court has ruled that the federal government's failure to manage
wild animals under its control may be a taking.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Mountain States Legal
Foundationv. Clark might radically affect the BLM's management of wild
horses and burros wherever there are unfenced private lands intermingled with public land. In order to examine that decision, it is necessary
to discuss the statutory provisions which allow grazing on the public
checkerboard lands of southwestern Wyoming. It is also necessary to
discuss prior state and federal cases dealing with unconstitutional takings.
BACKGROUND

Taylor Grazing Act
Grazing on the public lands in the checkerboard is administered by
the BLM under authority of the Taylor Grazing Act.I The checkerboard
is administered as a grazing "allotment"' 2 in which slightly over half the
forage is on the public land.' 3 RSGA holds a grazing preference' 4 which
entitles it to graze its livestock on the public lands within the allotment.
The BLM must manage the public land "on the basis of multipleuse."" 5 In order to achieve that objective, the BLM can either suspend
17
6
livestock use on public land or remove excess numbers of wild horses.
9. Id at 794.
10. Id. at 795.
11. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 315-315q (West 1974 & Supp. 1984).
12. For a definition of allotment see 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1984): "[An area of land
designated and managed for grazing of livestock."
13. BLM, Salt Wells-Pilot Butte Grazing Environmental Impact Statement 18 (1983).
Table 1-13 specifies that 49.1 percent of the forage in the Rock Springs Allotment (the checkerboard area) is located on private land.
14. 43 C.F.R. § 4110.2-2 (1984). The grazing preference is the amount of grazing use
allocated to a qualified livestock operator in a given allotment.
15. 43 U.S.C.S. § 1701(a)(7) (Law. Coop. 1980).
16. 43 C.F.R. § 4110.3-2(b) (1984).
17. 43 C.F.R. § 4740.1 (1984).
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This decision is wholly discretionary with the agency. For example, in Bar
X Sheep Co., the BLM temporarily suspended a portion of the livestock
operators' grazing preference because of a temporary excess number of
wild horses on an allotment.' 8 The ranchers filed suit and attacked the
BLM's decision as arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion because
no time limit was set on the temporary suspension. 9 The court in
upholding the government's action, stated:
There appears to be no requirement in the law that a decision providing for a temporary suspension of grazing preferences specify
a time limit for such suspensions. The suspension is by its nature
dependent on causes whose duration is difficult to determine. The
necessary implication ... must be that the suspension will be effective at least so long as the situation persists which gave rise
to the action.2"
When an agency makes an allocation decision to achieve multiple-use
management goals, it cannot give a higher priority to one use over another
unless there is a clear mandate in a specific law to do SO. 2 ' The agency
must take into account all pertinent factors such as the ecology, existing
uses, and their relative values in a particular area. But, no overall prior22
ity is assigned to any specific use under multiple-use management.
In American Horse Protection Association v. Frizze4 the United
States District Court for the District of Nevada held that both wild horses
and cattle possess equal status on public lands. 2 In that action, the Wild
Horse Protection Association sought to enjoin the BLM from rounding
up part of a wild horse herd in the Stone Cabin Valley area of Nevada.24
The association contended that horses had a higher priority on public land
than did livestock. It maintained that the BLM should suspend cattle grazing before the agency removed the wild horses.2
The district court found the area to be overgrazed and also found that
removal of the horses was an authorized and reasonable means to prevent further deterioration of the range. The court also noted that it would
probably have made the same decision if the BLM had decided to remove
cattle instead of horses.2 Frizzellillustrates that courts will generally defer
to the BLM when reviewing multiple-use management decisions involving public rangelands unless the BLM clearly gives one use a higher priority than another, in which case the agency's decision win be overruled as
18.
19.
20.
21.
1975).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Bar X Sheep Co., 88 Interior Dec. 665, 666 (1981).
Id at 670.
Id at 671 (citations omitted).
American Horse Protection Ass'n, Inc. v. Frizzell, 403 F. Supp. 1206, 1221 (D. Nev.
43 C.F.R. § 1725.3-1 (1984).
403 F. Supp. 1206, 1221 (D. Nev. 1975).
Id at 1208-09.
Id at 1220.
Id at 1221.
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arbitrary and capricious. 7 Otherwise, the courts will not overrule a BLM
multiple-use management decision.
In managing the public lands within the checkerboard the BLM must
administer RSGA's grazing preference in accordance with the Taylor Grazing Act. It must also manage the wild horse herd there as a component
of the multiple-use management scheme. If the lands become overgrazed,
it must make the choice of either reducing the wild horse herd or partially suspending RSGA's grazing preference on the public land. A partial
suspension in RSGA's grazing preference has the potential of affecting
up to one-half of its total grazing use on the checkerboard. As long as
the BLM's actions are within its statutory authority and28 are not arbitrary
and capricious they will be upheld on judicial review.
It must be noted that suspending RSGA's grazing preference on the
checkerboard allotment would not exclude it from using any portion of
the public land in the allotment. It would only reduce the amount or level
of use over the entire area. This is due to the checkerboard nature of the
land ownership pattern. There are few fences in the area and therefore
at any particular time there is a fifty percent chance that an animal is
grazing on public land. If the BLM suspended all of RSGA's livestock
grazing preference on the allotment, there would be no practical way to
stop the livestock from grazing on public land. Therefore, fifty percent
of RSGA's grazing would still occur on public land. But RSGA would
utilize only one-half as much forage on public land, and only half of the
forage on its privately owned land. One-half of the forage on the overall
area would be left for the BLM to allocate to other uses such as forage
for wild horses or other wildlife.2"
The Wild and Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act
Congress passed the Wild and Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act
in response to inhumane treatment and economic exploitation of wild
horses and burros on public lands." The Act provides that the Secretary
of the Interior must protect and preserve all unbranded or unclaimed
horses on the public lands of the United States. It also provides that wild
horse management be integrated with the multiple-use management
system.3 1 The United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Act.3"
27. Bar X Sheep Co., 88 Interior Dec. 665, 670-71 (1981); American Horse Protection
Ass'n, Inc. v. Frizzell, 403 F. Supp. at 1217.
28. See Arlington Hosp. v. Schweiker, 547 F. Supp. 670, 680 (1982) for the definition
of arbitary and capricious: "Agency action is arbitrary and capricious when it is willful and
unreasonable action, without consideration and in disregard of [the] facts or circumstances
of the case."
29. See 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 315-315q (West 1974 & Supp. 1984) for a detailed explanation
of grazing use on public lands administered by the BLM.
30. 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2149-50.
31. 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 1331, 1333 (Law. Coop. 1984).
32. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
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Under the Act, the Secretary must remove wild horses and burros that
stray onto privately owned land. 3 This is an unusual statutory provision
among those statutes that protect wild animals. 3 The Act does not expressly provide a remedy to landowners whose property has been invaded by wild horses, but federal courts have issued writs of mandamus requiring the BLM to remove them." For instance, in Roaring Springs
Associates v. Andrus, ranchers challenged BLM regulations that only required the agency to remove wild horses and burros that entered fenced
private land.3" The United States District Court for the District of Oregon
struck down the regulations and held that the government owes a duty
to landowners to remove wild horses from private land upon notice,
whether the land is fenced or not. The court went on to hold that mandamus is available to the private landowner to require performance of that
duty.3 7 Since Roaring Springs, many actions have been brought3 8against
the BLM to require the removal of horses from private lands.

The Taking Issue
The United States government may take private property for a public
use through its eminent domain power. 9 The fifth amendment limits this
power by specifying that private property cannot be "taken" without just
compensation. It40 also specifies that private property can only be taken
for a public use.
The government action need not be an actual use or occupation to constitute a taking. A taking may be found where the action interferes with
the use and value of the property.4 The United States Supreme Court
has not developed any set formula for determining when justice and
fairness require that economic injuries caused by government action
should be compensated. Instead, the Court determines each case on an
ad hoc factual basis.4 2 In taking cases where eminent domain has not been

33. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1334 (Law. Coop. 1984).
34. Only the Bald and Golden Eagle Act has a similar statutory provision. 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 668(a) (West Supp. 1984). The Eagle Act allows a property owner to obtain a permit from
the Secretary of the Interior to destroy or remove eagles that are destroying livestock or
agricultural crops. A similar remedy is provided in the case of grizzly bears in the Code of
Federal Regulations. 50 C.F.R. § 17.40 (1983).
35. In Roaring Springs Assocs. v. Andrus, 471 F. Supp. 522, 526 (D. Or. 1978), and
in Fallini v. Watt, No. 81-536 (D. Nev. Oct. 4, 1984), the courts ruled that the Secretary has
a mandatory duty to remove wild horses from private land promptly upon notice from the
landowner.
36. 43 C.F.R. § 4750.3 (1984).
37. Roaring Springs Assocs. v. Andrus, 471 F. Supp. 522, 525-26 (D. Or. 1978).
38. Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Clark, 740 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1984); Fallini
v. Watt, No. 81-536 (D. Nev. Oct. 4, 1984).
39. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 480 (2d ed. 1983).

40. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
41. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA

& J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

491 (2d ed. 1983).

42. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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exercised, the property owner
must bring an action in inverse condemna43
tion to recover damages.
The United States Supreme Court has used several tests to determine
if a government action constitutes a taking of private property. These
tests are: the physical invasion test-whether or not the government or
its agents have physically used or occupied something belonging to the
claimant; and the diminution of value test-the extent of harm sustained
by the claimant or the degree to which his property has been devalued."
The Physical Invasion Test
Recently, the Supreme Court has created a per se taking rule where
the government action is a permanent physical invasion. In Loretto v.
TeleprompterManhattan CATV Corp., the installation of thirty-six feet
of one-half inch cable and a four inch square box in an apartment building
was found to be a taking.45 The Court reiterated the rule that a permanent physical occupation is a government action of such unique character
that it is a taking without regard to other factors. Although the rule was
not new, it had never been applied to such an insignificant invasion. The
Court commented that a permanent physical occupation is perhaps the
most serious form of invasion of an owner's property interest.4 6

Whenever a government action allows public access to private property, the Court views that action as a physical invasion and a taking will

be found. In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the government imposed a
navigational servitude which allowed public access to a marina in a privately owned lagoon. The Court found that this was a taking. 7 The Court
reasoned that public access denied the owners the right to exclude, "one
of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly

characterized as property.

'4

43. See Thompson v. Tualatin Hills Park and Recreation Dist., 496 F. Supp. 530, 539
(D. Or. 1980), for a definition of inverse condemnation: "[A] cause of action against a governmental entity to recover value of property taken by entity even though no formal power
of eminant domain has been completed."
44. See Michelman, Property,Utility, and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical foundations of "JustCompensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). Professor Michelman identified four possible tests but only the two discussed in the text can apply to the facts in
Mountain States.
One of the other tests described by Professor Michelman was the BalancingSocial Gains
AgainstPrivateLosses test. He stated that it is rarely used, and he cited no Supreme Court
cases where it had been used. The test is used where a court assumes the role of appraising
the efficiency of a legislative measure. The court then balances society's gain from the legislation against the burden that it places on an individual. There are no objective standards
for this test and it will not be discussed in this note. It is impossible to tell from the Mountain States opinion whether the Tenth Circuit even considered this test.
The other test described by Professor Michelman was the Private Fault and Public
Benefit test. The test is used when a landowner is enjoined from using his land in a manner
that is perceived as a nuisance. The Supreme Court has used this test to uphold land use
regulations that prohibit certain activities. The facts in Mountain States clearly do not fit
within this test.
45. 458 U.S. 419, 422 (1982).
46. Id at 435.
47. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1979).
48. Id
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A public-right-of way usually involves a road or some other physical
structure. The structure is easily seen as a physical occupation. In Kaiser
Aetna, the access was by way of a watercourse, not by any type of physical
structure."' But the result was the same as if the government had built
a public road into the landowner's marina. Although the Court in Kaiser
Aetna based its holding on the landowner's right to exclude the public,
it is clear that the government's imposition of a public right-of-way was
tantamount to a physical invasion.
A physical invasion may also be found when the invasion is indirect.
In United States v. Causby, the Supreme Court was asked to decide
whether low overhead flights by military aircraft could constitute a
physical invasion.50 The flights were directly over the claimant's home and
chicken ranch, and they occurred at all hours of the day. 5' The Court held
that whenever a government action directly interferes with a property
owner's ability to use and enjoy his land, the action will constitute a
physical invasion." But a physical invasion must be permanent to constitute a taking. The Court therefore remanded the case to the trial court
to determine if the invasion in Causby was permanent.5"
The Diminution of Value Test
The diminution of value is an important consideration when government regulations prohibit the use of private property and the government
action is not a physical invasion. 54 This test is used when a court looks
at the validity of land use regulations, such as zoning regulations. In applying the test, it is the degree to which the property is devalued rather
than the dollar amount of the harm that is determinative. 5 For instance,
in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon Co., Justice Holmes stated, "when [the
regulation] reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases, there
must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the
act. "56 In Mahon, the regulations restricting coal mining had rendered the
claimant's mine useless. The effect of the regulations was found to be so
extensive that a taking had occurred."
Under this test, an owner may have to put up with very substantial
losses as long as the land retains some use and market value."5 In Euclid
v. Ambler Realty, a property owner was denied the ability to develop his
land for industrial purposes. No taking was found even though the owner's
only option was to develop the land as residential property which resulted
in a much lower economic return."
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 167-68.
328 U.S. 256, 258 (1945).
Id at 258-59.
Id at 266.
Id at 267-68.
Michelman, supra note 44, at 1191.
Id at 1190-91.
260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
Id at 414.
Michelman, supra note 44, at 1192.
272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926).
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In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the Supreme
Court upheld the validity of regulations which prohibited building a fiftyfive story office building on top of Grand Central Station.6 The Court
held that no taking had6 occurred because the property still retained its
present use and value. '
Taking Cases Involving Wild Animals
The Supreme Court has never determined whether damage caused by
wild animals can constitute a taking. Several state and federal courts have
confronted the issue however. The general rule is that the government,
62
through its actions or inactions, is not liable for damage done by wildlife.
This non-liability rule is based on the legal fiction that the government does not actually own wild animals but is instead holding them in
trust for the benefit of all people. This attitude was articulated by the
Supreme Court in Douglas v. Seacoast Products Inc. There the Court
stated:
A State does not stand in the same position as the owner of a
private game preserve and it is pure fantasy to talk of "owning"
wild fish, birds or animals. Neither the States nor the Federal
Government, anymore than a hopeful fisherman or hunter, has
title to these creatures
until they are reduced to possession by
63
skillful capture.
In Sickman v. United States, certain actions by government agents
caused geese to congregate on the claimant's land and inflict damage to
standing crops. ' The landowners brought suit for damages caused by the
trespassing geese. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
the government could not be held liable for the trespasses of animals which
are ferae naturae, and have not been reduced to possession.65 Although
plaintiffs based their claim on trespass and not on a taking theory, this
case points out the general attitude that courts take toward wild animals.
After plaintiffs failed to prevail in Sickman, they initiated a new action based on the same set of facts but on a theory that the goose damage
constituted a taking of their property.66 In this suit, entitled Bishop v.
United States, the court of claims noted that many governmental actions
often adversely affect private property and that by itself did not constitute
60. 438 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1978).
61. Id. at 127. The Court applied the test fromMahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922), where
Justice Holmes stated, "[tihe general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."
62. See Leger v. Louisiana Dep't of Wildlife & Fisheries, 306 So. 2d 391 (La. Ct. App.
1975), writ denied, 310 So. 2d 640 (1975); Cook v. State, 192 Wash. 602, 74 P.2d 199 (1937);
Platt v. Philbrick, 8 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 27, 47 P.2d 302 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
63. 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977).
64. 184 F.2d 616, 617-18 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 939 (1951).
65. Id at 618.
66. Bishop v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 449, 451 (Ct. C1. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
955 (1955).
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a taking.67 It also found that the government's actions were not an invasion of the claimant's property. The court stated:
The gist of the whole matter is that Congress has passed an Act,
valid under the Constitution, which prohibited the hunting of wild
geese except as permitted by the Secretary of the Interior, and
the Secretary of Interior has refused to give the required permisthis, of course, the Government
sion in the area in question. 6For
8
is not liable as for a taking.
Several state courts have also held that wildlife damage caused by
state action is not a taking. Collopy v. Wildlife Commission, Department
of NaturalResources, is the latest state case dealing with the "taking
by wildlife" issue. 69 In Collopy, the wildlife commission closed a four
square- mile area around the claimant's farm to goose hunting. Geese used
the area and damaged crops there. Collopy contended the damage was
a compensable taking because the closure had turned his farm into a de
facto game refuge.70 The court held that the mere ownership of wildlife
by the state does not expose it to liability for wildlife inflicted crop
damage. 1
Collopy involved an action brought under article 2, section 15 of the
Colorado Constitution.12 The Colorado Supreme Court used the diminution of value test in finding that no taking had occurred. The court
specifically found that the state had a legitimate goal in protecting wildlife,
the closure was substantially related to achieving it, and the landowner
was not precluded by the regulation from making a reasonable use of his
land." The court also noted it might have reached a different result if plaintiff had incurred more substantial damages.7'
Not all courts have refused to recognize that wildlife damage cannot
constitute a taking. The supreme courts of two states have found takings that resulted from wildlife inflicted damage.75 In Shellnut v. Arkansas State Game and Fish Commission, the Arkansas Supreme Court held
that a taking had occurred when wildlife trespassed onto private land
because of state action." The state had established a game refuge surrounding the claimant's land and prohibited hunting over the entire refuge,
including the claimant's land. 7 The court, using the diminution of value
test, found that the state's action seriously restricted the landowner's use
67. Id. at 452.
68. Id.
69. 625 P.2d 994 (Colo. 1981).
70. Id at 996-98.
71. Id at 1000.
72. CoLo. CONST. art. II, § 15. Section 15 states: "Private property shall not be taken
or damaged, for public or private use, without just compensation."
73. Collopy v. Wildlife Comm'n, 625 P.2d 994, 1001-02 (Colo. 1981).
74. Id at 1002.
75. 222 Ark. 25, 258 S.W.2d 570 (1953).
76. Id at 29, 258 S.W.2d at 573.
77. Id. at 27-29, 258 S.W.2d at 571-72.
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of his lands. 78 The same result was reached in Wisconsin in the case of

State v. Herwig, where the facts were very similar to those in Shellnut.79
Even though the result in Shellnut was different than the result in
Collopy, the same test was applied in both cases. The difference in the
results reflects the difference in what courts will view to be a substantial
interference with a landowner's property. A factual difference between
Sheilnut and Collopy is that in Shellnut the action arose after the state
of Arkansas had failed to negotiate leases to allow deer to use Shelinut's
land,"0 while in Collopy leasing was not in issue.8' Apparently, in Arkansas it is customary for the state to acquire leases for wildlife use while
it is not in Colorado.
A taking will not be found unless the government's actions are a
physical invasion or the owner's use of the property is substantially
impaired. 8 A physical invasion can occur by the placement of a permanent fixture on the property or by indirect means if it substantially impairs the use of property.83 If the government's action is not a physical
invasion, courts apply the diminution of value test to determine if the prop8
erty owner's use is impaired to the point that a taking will be found. 4
In cases where wild animals have been the instruments of a government's
alleged taking, the diminution of value test is employed by the courts.
No taking is found unless the facts show that the animals cause a substantial impairment on the landowner's use of the property. 5
PRINCIPAL CASE

Mountain States Legal Foundation u. Clark reached the Tenth Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals on an appeal of a summary judgment granted to
the Secretary of the Interior. The district court had granted the summary
judgment against RSGA's inverse condemnation action. The court of appeals had no trial record and its ruling was
based on the parties' affidavits
6
and the allegations in the pleadings.1

In Mountain States, RSGA alleged that the BLM had failed to effectively manage the wild horses on the checkerboard lands as evidenced by
the increase in the number of horses in the area since 1971. RSGA also
claimed that the resulting foraging of the wild horses constituted a compensable taking of their property. 7
78. Id at 29, 258 S.W.2d at 573.
79. 17 Wis. 2d 442, 117 N.W.2d 335 t1962).
80. 222 Ark. 25, 27, 258 S.W.2d 570, 572 (1953). See also State v. Herwig, 17 Wis. 2d
442, 448, 117 N.W.2d 335, 339 (1962).
81. 625 P.2d 994 (Colo. 1981).
82. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-30 (1978).
83. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982);
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1945).
84. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1945).
85. See Collopy v. Wildlife Comm'n, 625 P.2d 994, 1001-02 (Colo. 1981); Shellnut v.
Arkansas State Game & Fish Comm'n, 222 Ark. 25, 29, 258 S.W.2d 570, 573 (1953).
86. Mountain States, 740 F.2d at 793-95.
87. Id. at 793.
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The Secretary of the Interior, in his answer, admitted to an overpopulation of horses and an excessive demand on the range, but took no
position on whether the horses had been mismanaged.8 The Secretary,
in his motion for summary judgment, alleged that RSGA had no cause
of action on the compensable taking claim.
RSGA also alleged that the BLM had an affirmative duty to remove
wild horses from their private land and sought a writ of mandamus to
compel the government to do so. The district court granted the writ on
a motion for summary judgment.8 9 The Secretary did not raise the issue
on appeal so the court of appeals took no position on the issue in the present case.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found the BLM had an affirmative
duty to manage the horses.9 0 It then held that if the BLM had failed to
carry out this duty, the resulting foraging of wild horses on private land
would be an unconstitutional taking of the landowner's property. The court
based its holding on the fact that the Act was unique from other statutes
which related to wild birds and animals. 9' The court of appeals remanded
the issue to the district court for a factual determination of whether the
BLM had failed to manage the wild horses.92
The court did not consider the horses to be "wild animals." This view
was based on the fact that many of the horses were originally ungathered
ranch horses and that local ranchers had introduced studs of good varieties
to improve the herds.93 The court felt that the ancestry of the horses made
them unique as to other wild animals under the control of the federal
government.
The exclusive and complete control of the wild horses by the government was also used by the court to distinguish the Act from other wild
animal statutes. The court noted that no one but the government can
manage the horses and stated, "This degree of control can become the
significant factor in an examination of the liability of the government."'
But, the court did not elaborate on exactly how the degree of control was
different from other statutes protecting wild animals.
The Tenth Circuit narrowed its holding to cases involving checkerboard lands. It stated, "It is only by reason of the checkerboard ownership of the lands that horse control and management could become a factor or issue on the taking of plaintiffs' property." 5 The court reasoned
that the Secretary's actions regarding horse management had a porportionately higher impact on private holdings within checkerboard lands,
than on isolated tracts of private property. 6
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id
Id.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at 794.
at 793-95.
at
at
at
at
at

794-95.
795.
793.
794.
795.

96. Id
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The Duty to Manage
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that the government's liability for a taking arose from the duties imposed on the BLM
by the Wild and Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. Specifically, the
court found the duties imposed on the BLM under the Act are the duty
to manage the number of wild horses and the duty to remove them from
private property upon an owner's request.97 The court noted that RSGA's
taking allegation was based on the BLM's alleged breach of these duties. 8
The BLM's failure to remove the horses from RSGA's land was remedied
by the district court in granting the writ of manadamus. 99 However, the
court of appeals held a taking had occurred if the BLM had breached its
duty to manage the number of wild horses on the checkerboard. 0 But
the court failed to articulate a standard for determining whether the
BLM's actions or inactions breached its duty to manage.
Several standards for determining whether the BLM breached its duty
to manage may be gleaned from the Mountain States opinion. RSGA alleged in its complaint that it desired to maintain and preserve a reasonable
number of wild horses on the checkerboard.' 0' The presence of any horses
on the checkerboard means, however, that horses will be present on RSGA
land at least fifty percent of the time. The issue therefore, is not the
presence of wild horses on private lands but the number of horses in the
checkerboard area. If the court interprets the BLM's duty to "manage"
to mean controlling the horse population on the checkerboard, then apparently there can be no taking if the horse population were kept at a
reasonablenumber. Although the court of appeals did not say so explicitly, it hinted that the 1971 horse population on the checkerboard was the
02
guide in determining what constitutes a reasonable number of horses.
The court of appeals only directed the district court to inquire back to
1971, indicating10 that
the horse population on the checkerboard in 1971
3
was reasonable.
Presumably the duty to remove horses from private lands on the
checkerboard does not arise if the horse population on the checkerboard
is reasonably controlled. The nature of land ownership in the checkerboard
is such that horses in the area will continually trespass on private land.
So the court's holding must be interpreted to mean that if the number
of horses on the checkerboard is reasonable, there is no breach of the agency's duty to manage. If the horse population exceeds a reasonable number,
the BLM will have breached its duty to remove horses from private property and its duty to manage, exposing it to liability for a taking of the
97. Id. at 794.
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private forage consumed. The question which remains, however, is whether
the BLM's breach of the duty to manage necessarilyconstitutes a taking
as the court of appeals implies.
Taking
The most troubling aspect of Mountain States is that the court held
the foraging of wild horses could be an unconstitutional taking of RSGA's
property. In reaching this decision, the court of appeals failed to cite any
cases in support of its holding. The court also failed to engage in any
analysis on the taking issue. Therefore, one is left to speculate as to how
the court found that the foraging of wild horses of RSGA's lands could
be an unconstitutional taking. As the following discussion will show, under
any taking analysis, a breach of the BLM's duty to manage wild horses
on the checkerboard cannot be a taking under the Supreme Court's taking tests.
Physical Invasion Test
The court in Mountain States may have based it's holding on the conclusion that the Secretary of the Interior's actions constituted a physical
invasion of RSGA's land. In fact, RSGA argued this very point in its appeal to the Tenth Circuit.'04 As exemplified by Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., a permanent physical occupation is never exempt from the taking clause.1"5
But, the nature of the occupation of Loretto was clearly different than
the occupation in Mountain States. In Loretto, a permanent fixture was
placed on the claimant's land because of government action.106 The wild
horses are not a permanent fixture on RSGA's private land. They continually move between public and private lands and the number of horses
continually varies.
In Loretto, the Supreme Court emphasized that in applying the
physical invasion test it distinguishes between a permanent physical occupation and the situation where the government's action is a "more temporary invasion." ' 7 Under Loretto, there is no per se taking unless the
government's action constitutes a permanent physical occupation. The
horses are not a permanent physical occupation because the BLM continually removes horses from the area. 0 8 Also, under the Wild Horse Act,
if the BLM fails to remove horses from private land, private landowners
104. Appellant's Reply Brief at 1-2, Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Clark, 740
F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1984).
105. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
106. Id. at 422.
107. Id. at 428.
108. BLM, Salt Wells-Pilot Butte Environmental Impact Statement 76 (1983). Table
2-18 shows the horse population on the checkerboard area had been reduced to below 2,100
horses by February, 1983. Whether the population was further reduced is not known but
the reduction shows the BLM is actively removing wild horses.
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can obtain a writ of mandamus to require the BLM to remove the horses. 109
In fact, RSGA obtained a writ of mandamus from the district court in
Mountain States.
The court in Mountain States may have found the presence of the
horses to be an indirect occupation. In United States v. Causby, the Court
found that an indirect occupation by the government could be a physical
invasion. But like the diminution of value test, the indirect physical invasion test requires a showing that the landowner's use and enjoyment of
his property is substantially impaired. The Court found a taking in Causby
if low overhead flights of military aircraft made a claimant's property
uninhabitable and destroyed the owner's chicken raising business."'
If the court found that the horses constituted an indirect occupation
in Mountain States, the court misapplied the test. RSGA did not show
that it had been denied the use of its private land in the checkerboard
nor is it likely that it could. Appoximately half of the land in the checkerboard is public land on which RSGA holds a grazing preference administered under the Taylor Grazing Act. Therefore, in order for the court
to find an indirect occupation, RSGA would have to show that the wild
horses were consuming more than fifty percent of the forage on the
checkerboard lands. Unless the horse population reached this level, RSGA
could not show that the BLM's actions (or inactions) interefered with the
use of its property. RSGA did not even allege that the wild horses were
consuming more than fifty percent of the forage on the checkerboard
lands."'
RSGA also maintained that the BLM's management (or nonmanagement) interfered with their right to exclude others from their
property.' 2 The Supreme Court found that a taking had occurred in Kaiser
Aetna v. United States where the government imposed a public access
requirement to a private marina. The court reasoned that allowing public
access denied the property owners the right to exclude others and was
analogous to a physical invasion."'
The holding in Kaiser Aetna clearly does not apply to the facts in
Mountain States. In KaiserAetna, the government imposed a public right
of way onto private property." 4 In Mountain States, the BLM did not
impose a public right-of-way on RSGA's land. The BLM only allowed the
increase of the wild horses that have been on the checkerboard area since
before RSGA owned any property there.
KaiserAetna held that the right to exclude others was a fundamental element of the right to own property." 5 This right to exclude others
109. See Roaring Springs Assocs. v. Andrus, 471 F. Supp. 522, 526 JD. Or. 1978); Fallini
v. Watt, No. 81-536, slip op. at 4 (D. Nev. Oct. 4, 1984).
110. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1945).
111. Mountain States, 740 F.2d at 797 (McKay, J., dissenting).
112. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 19-20.
113. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 164, 174-80 (1979).
114. Id. at 168.
115. Id. at 179-80.
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should apply only to people and not to wild animals. No courts have ever
held that the federal government must obtain an easement before wild
animals can enter upon private land. If that was the rule, the government
would be theoretically liable for a taking every time a wild animal ate a
blade of grass on private property. KaiserAetna should be limited to cases
involving public access, and should not be extended to wild animals.
Diminution of Value Test
Using the diminution of value test, the grazing of wild horses on
RSGA's private land could not be a taking. Under this test, RSGA would
have to show that the wild horses substantially impaired the use of their
land. In Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York City, the Court
found no taking in spite of the fact that the owners had to forego a substantial investment return. The Supreme Court pointed out they had not been
completely deprived of their use of the property." 6 The same conclusion
was reached in Euclid v. Ambler Realty.'" In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, where the Court did find a taking, the owners had been completely denied all use and investment return of their coal mine.I s In Mountain
States, RSGA did not even argue they had been deprived of all beneficial
use of their lands." 9 In fact, it is clear that RSGA has not been completely deprived of any grazing use on either the public or private lands in the
checkerboard. RSGA can still graze livestock on its private land in the
area.
State and federal cases dealing with the wildlife taking issue have all
used the diminution of value as the test to determine if there was a
taking. "' In these taking cases, the facts underlying the alleged taking
were extremely important in determining whether an actual taking had
occurred.2 This is exemplified by the split in authority between the
Collopy" ' and Shellnut 22 decisions. However, in Mountain States, the
court had only minimal facts before it because the issue came up on summary judgment motions." s If the court did use the diminuition of value
test, it was inapropriate in light of the fact that the court had only a scant
evidentiary record.
The Wild and Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act
In order to justify its taking holding, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals made several distinctions between the Wild Horse Act and other
legislation which protects wild animals. The court reasoned that the Wild
Horse Act was unique because wild horses are not "wild animals" and
116. 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
117. 272 U.S. 365, 384-85 (1926).
118. 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
119. 740 F.2d at 797 (McKay, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
120. See infra text accompanying notes 64-81.
121. Collopy v. Wildlife Comm'n, 625 P.2d 994, 1001 (Colo. 1981).
122. Shellnut v. Arkansas State Game and Fish Comm'n, 222 Ark. 25, 29, 258 S.W.2d
570, 573 (1953).
123. Mountain States, 740 F.2d at 793-94.
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because the government has complete and exclusive control over them.1 4
The former distinction is irrelevant and the latter is simply not true.
It is irrelevant whether the horses are "wild animals"; they, like other
wild animals, are not owned by private individuals. The question is
whether their legal status under the Wild and Free-Roaming Horses and
Burros Act is different from other wild animals. In his dissenting opinion
in Mountain States, Judge McKay stated he did not think so.1"5 The majority cited no authority to support its theory that the wild horses are
viewed differently in the eyes of the law than other animals protected by
Congress. The natural history of wild horses should not be a consideration in comparing the legal consequences of the Wild Horse Act with other
wildlife protection legislation.
The "exclusive control" distinction used by the court of appeals to
distinguish the Wild Horse Act is simply erroneous. Every wildlife protection act gives the federal government the exclusive control over the
animals being protected.126 The typical statute states that it is unlawful
to take the protected animal unless authorized by the appropriate agency. The definition of take is very broad and includes virtually any active
encounter with the protected species.'2 7 None of the statutes allow landowners to remove wild animals merely because they are on private property. The Wild Horse Act also prohibits landowners from removing horses
from their property. On that basis, the Wild Horse Act is no different than
any other wildlife protection statute.
Other courts could easily reject the Tenth Circuit's distinctions and
apply the holding of Mountain States to other wildlife statutes. The
resulting liability of the federal government would be startling if it had
to compensate landowners for damage caused to private property by wild
animals other than wild horses.
The district court had provided RSGA with a remedy to prevent future
trespasses by ordering the removal of wild horses on the checkerboard.
But this did not provide relief for past damages allegedly suffered by
RSGA. The Tenth Circuit was apparently attempting to remedy this by
ruling that there was a taking if the BLM had not properly managed the
horses. The court could have reached the same result by holding that
RSGA had a cause of action in trespass.""5 With a trespass action, the
court could have avoided the difficult taking issue. In order to hold that
124. Id. at 794.
125. Id. at 796 (McKay, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
126. See The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 668-668d (West 1974
& Supp. 1984); Migratory Bird Treaty, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 703-711 (West 1974 & Supp. 1984).
127. See Migratory Bird Treaty, 16 U.S.C.A. § 703 (West 1974 & Supp. 1984) for a definition of take: "It shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pursue,
hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer
to barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship,. . . [specified bird
or animal species]."
128. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1346 (Law. Coop. 1977 & Supp. 1984). Section 1346(b) of the Federal
Torts Claim Act waives sovereign immunity for claims for money damages against the United
States for injury or loss of property caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission
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there was a possible taking, the court had to hand down a decision citing
no precedent and lacking any relevant analysis. If it had recognized a
trespass action for RSGA, the court could have remanded for the factual
determination of the elements of a well-established tort action. Instead,
the district court was left to determine what constituted proper horse
management even though it was given no standard by which to measure
proper management.
CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found a taking but never
engaged in any in-depth analysis or cited any precedent for its ruling. The
BLM may have breached its statutory duty to manage the horses on the
checkerboard. However, the court should have but failed to recognize that
the only remedy under the Wild and Free Roaming Horses and Burros
Act was the removal of horses from the checkerboard. If the court wished
to provide an additional remedy to RSGA, providing an unconstitutional
taking action was inappropriate. When a taking analysis is done, it is obvious that no taking occurred. Because of the court's lack of analysis and
its questionable distinction of the Wild and Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act with other wildlife protection statutes, Mountain States may be
applied to other wildlife statutes. If that happens, the Mountain States
decision could radically affect the government's management of wildlife
for years to come.
Michael J. Finn*

of any employee of the government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
A tort action against the government within the facts of Mountain States is outside the
scope of this note.
*The author was employed as a range conservationist by the BLM, Rock Springs District,
from May 1979 until August 1983.
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